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Science-History Center Library Book on File
Archive/Library Overview |
This Page is dedicated to Dr.
Harold Zahl. Dr. Zahl was the Director of Reasearch from 1948
to 1966 at Fort Monmouth's Camp Evans. He wrote many scientific papers,
articles and two books on the history he was a part of. We have a
number of his personal files in the Infoage
Archive. Thanks to Dr. Zahl we have a look into the history of Camp Evans
from a more personal point of view. You can read from the top or use the
side bar on the left to find things of interest to you.
Thanks to Dr. Zahl's family for permission to use the copyrighted material
from "Electrons Away".
ELECTRONS AWAY
or
TALES OF A GOVERNMENT SCIENTIST
By Harold A. Zahl
Vantage Press
Dr. Zahl was the chief Scientist at Camp Evans.
CONTENTS
Forward by Jerome B. Wiesner, Provost M.I.T
Introduction 13
Part I
The Antediluvian 17
Part II
World War II 59
Part III
Utopia at Last (?) 89
ADDENDUM
Christopher James Speaks Out 136
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Back to InfoAge Homepage Created July 3, 1999
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Article excerpts from:
Dr. Zahl Stories from his book: Electrons Away The Signal Corps recognized the need to detect enemy
aircraft during WWI and the importance of radio. In fact during WWI
the Navy siezed the Marconi Wireless stations. As WWII approached
one Marconi station would be siezed again to continue aircraft detection
research and become Camp Evans.
Did Dr. Zahl cause the Hindenburg to explode?
What convinced the Army brass to give the radar group the funding they
needed?
A captured German radar set is flown to Evans for repair
and analysis. Find out how Dumont Radio helped the Signal Corps reduced
8th Air Force causalities over Europe
OK, Whose radar was best...British or the Signal Corps?
Read the results of a set to set test on a New Jersey beach.
A the beginning of WWII the Signal Corps was offered
help from MIT scientists. The Signal Corps had a war to run, their
equipment was ready and what did MIT know about miltary equipment requirements?
So to keep them busy, the Signal Corps gave MIT the microwave band to work
with, this was the band that showed the most promise for radar but the
Signal Corps was unsuccessful in developing a transmission tube powerfull
enough to do the job. Little did MIT or the Signal Corps know the Bristish
had developed a microwave transmitted more powerful than anything to date
and it was on it's way across the Atlantic. The results are history.
Two of the MIT 'Long Hairs', Dr. Davenport and Dr. Getting provided Camp
Evans and the IEEE History Center oral history interviews.
Mr. Marchetti (currently age 91) is a Camp Evans SUPER-HERO.
On Memorial Day 1999 he received an award from France for his part in the
liberation of France. He adds this to his award from the British - 'Order
of the British Empire'. Mr. Marchetti and his radar equipment landed
during the Normandy Invasion. He came back to Camp Evans for an oral
history interview which was featured in the Asbury Park Press. He
is one of the original developers of Signal Corps Radar, played a part
in it's deployment and a constant improvement to meet changing combat needs.
Now read what happened when the guy took Christmas day off in 1943 and
did not answer his phone... who could operate the experimental radar at
Camp Evans to detect the German aircraft carrier attack?
In 1999 James Broderick, Asbury Park Press correspondent
and Peter Ackerman, staff photographer photographed Mr. Marchetti at Camp
Evans in front of the building where this story took place. General
MacArthur got what he needed. As a side note this request was turned
down as impossible by all radar labs, until they got to Mr. Marchetti...
"Radar won the war and the A-bomb ended it" - It took
a lot of electron tubes to win this war. Every radio, radar set,
proximity fuse in a shell had tubes. And, of yes, the A-bomb was
triggered with a radar fuse...the prototypes came from Camp Evans (AN/APS-13).
We just told you radar and tubes won the War...when
they worked.
When radar and tubes won the War...when they worked. The Japanese Pay a Compliment
(sort-of) to Dr. Zahl. Or, flattery in electronic warfare
11) The Space Age Starts at Camp Evans 12) Camp Evans radar tracks a comet: Giacobini-Zinner 13) Dr. Zahl takes part in the BIKINI A-Bomb tests. 14) Project Paperclip, V-2s and the Birth of the American Space Program. If the military had put a top-secret lock on the transistor,
would our computer industry be where it is today? Read Dr. Zahl's views
here.
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" The scope of SCEL’s projects literally covers dozens of scientific fields. American military radar was born at Monmouth, with Dr. Harold A. Zahl, now SCEL’s research director, personally devising certain types of necessary vacuum tubes which were unavailable from industry at that time because of lack of commercial interest. Later, Monmouth scientists, for the first time in history, bounced radar waves off the moon. Now they are using the magic electronic finger of radar for practically every conceivable purpose, from tracking hurricanes to taking wind velocity and temperature readings from the nose of a rocket soaring in the stratosphere." In years of service, research director Zahl, through only forty-seven, is the veteran of SCEL’s top civilian scientists. “I came here twenty-one years ago, just after earning my doctorate from the University of Iowa, because someone told me Monmouth would be a good place to spend a winter,” Zahl said. “I’ve been here ever since.” One of his first assignments was in connection with a joint Signal Corps-Coast Artillery experiment on antisubmarine defenses. It involved placing four buoys, anchored by the toughest existing steel cable, existing steel cable, off the Jersey coast. “Naturally, we couldn’t tell the newspapers what we were doing, so one of the tabloids conceived the idea, which it luridly chronicled, that we were launching scientific warfare against the rumrunners of that era,” Zahl related. “It was supposed to be a device that would enable us to listen to conversations on rum boats fifty miles out. The morning after that story appeared, we found our buoys missing. Such was science in the early ‘30’s.” During World War II it was necessary to sacrifice a great deal of long-range scientific research to the immediate job of producing needed hardware. Today, the top military and civilian authorities say, that is not the case. Even the demands of the Korean conflict have not crippled the program of research for the future. “we try to keep at least five years ahead of the user, and in certain fields, our thinking is at least twenty-five years ahead .” Doctor Zahl declared. “At the same time, however, since funds are limited and demand for immediate items is great, the laboratories must maintain a delicate balance between the practical and the visionary. We can’t throw away our dollars on the ridiculous. I can predict a twenty-five-year goal, but I can’t tell you when will have a man-made satellite circling in the slipstream of gravity.”
1) Recognizing the New Military THREAT - The Fabulous Scientific Genie of World War II Page 36 AIRPLANES. Time was now starting to move more rapidly.
One day a national magazine published a cartoon showing the Europa and
the Bremen passing each other in the mid-Atlantic with the Hindenburg flying
overhead. The cartoon’s caption was “Britannia Rules the Waves.”
…detecting aerial targets by reflection of radio
waves was given a supertop priority within the Signal Corps laboratories,
and communications research had to take a holiday. Soon we were tracking
airplanes and direction-finding on them, measuring also range. All
this information was given to us by reflecting radio signals, the energy
having been sent out in short pulses and returned in a millionth of a second
later, the precise time being the measurement of range based on the velocity
of light or 186,000 miles per second.
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3) Wurzburgs, the German 600 megacycle antiaircraft radar. Pg 46-48.
…the German little Wurzburgs, and they were very good,
I recall a small adventure I had with one. Our GI’s captured one
in Europe and it was quickly airfreighted to Monmouth so we could study
it and learn better how to use countermeasures against it. Unfortunately
the German crew objected to the “liberation” of this particular set, and
when our boys insisted, in a fit of temper, the Germans fired a fusillade
of bullets into the critical parts of the set. The set came to me
and soon our engineers were able to replace all broken parts except for
the most critical one, a cathode-ray tube the likes of which we had never
seen in this country – it was a complex multielectron gun affair.
I called my friend Allen B. Dumont who had
often helped us on cathode ray tubes problems. Within hours, he was
down in the Evans area and we went over the problem – or rather looked
at the pieces. “I’ll try,” he said, and we put all the pieces we
could find into a paper bag and he took them back to his plant.
Selecting his best engineers, he put them on three
shifts – and away they went. Four days later Allen called me and
said he had six identical tubes available and they would work, Shortly
afterward we had the Wurzburg operational, and moved rapidly to discover
its weaknesses, and there were some.
But, Allen had forgotten one thing – he didn’t
submit a bill. I told him he had to; regulations and that sort of
stuff. “No,” he said, “there’s a war on.” I insisted, and so
he finally said, “OK. Make it $100.00. Whoever bought the War Bond
that paid for those tubes really got his money’s worth plus.”
4) Whose radar was better….British or American? Pg. 62
As larger numbers of these ETG officers (Electronics
Training Group) returned to the United States they were immediately integrated
into various elements of the Army, Navy, and the Air Corps.
Those whose training had been with the RAF, however,
tended to be quite critical of American-developed early warning radar,
the SCR-270 and 271. Thus throughout our Air Corps spread the thought
that the Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth was giving them equipment inferior
to that which they had seen combat-tested in England, and the voices grew
louder and louder.
So it came about that we, at Fort Monmouth, were
finally required to bring over the latest model of the British early warning
radar which we installed south toward Island Beach overlooking the Atlantic.
Signal Corps and Air Corps officers were intensely interested and watched
the indicating instruments as target airplanes flew at various altitudes
and to limiting ranges of detection. Simultaneously, a Signal Corps
radar took similar data… and the voices of criticism were rather quickly
attenuated.
The conclusions were rather simple: Our radar
was definitely the best one for its contemplated use with American forces,
and we were just learning how to use it and, equally important, to maintain
it in peak operating condition.
In England, faced with the threat of life or death,
it was imperative that, as a system, they extract every bit of data and,
organizationally, they had learned to do just that. In addition,
in England it was relatively easy to maintain the equipment because their
troubleshooters were no further away than the nearest telephone and many
lived with the equipment, for it was locally installed, a short bicycle
ride generally being all that was required to bring in a top scientist;
while the U.S. the same call for help might mean an airplane ride of thousands
of miles, and hours or days of waiting time.
In humor I might say that the ring of early warning
radars, which were installed covering much of our continental coast line,
not once did they fail in warning of an enemy attack… though I will also
admit that except for an occasional Japanese balloon on the West Coast
the opportunity on enemy airplanes, as it turned out, was about zero.
5) The NDRC, “long-haired” scientists, are assigned microwaves to “keep them out of our hair for a while” Pg. 66.
Since Pearl Harbor had ignited the entire nation,
the early trainees were not the only source of assistance entering the
scene of military electronics. Anticipating a national emergency,
President Roosevelt had already acted on June 27, 1940, to set up the National
Defense Research Committee. Chaired by Dr. Vannevar Bush, this committee
set up many laboratories and thus mobilized the acedemic scientific community.
Notably in the area of Monmouth research and development
interest, came the Radiation Laboratory at MIT; the Radio Research Laboratory
at Harvard; the Columbia Radiation Laboratory; and the laboratory set up
within the facilities of the National Bureau of Standards to work on proximity
fuses. But it is not my intension to re-recite herein the splendid
records of the many facets of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.
Many historians have already done this well.
Overlooked, however, while enemy cannons were firing,
it is amusing to recall a bit of jurisdictional war that went on between
certain military personnel at Monmouth and some of the elements of the
newly formed NDRC. That such should have happened in the early months
of conflict is understandable, when one considers that the men in uniform
wee extremely close to the actual fighting, while the “long-haired” scientists
- who desperately wanted to help - could only help in the battles of “tomorrow.”
In radar, a first solution to keep the two camps
separated was to give the professors all microwaves - a very researchy
subject at the time, but seemingly quite remote to application on immediate
problems of the day. “That should keep them out of our hair for a
while,” said one Signal Corps colonel, turning to the more immediate problems
of the European Theater.
In the meantime Monmouth personnel were told to
concentrate in keeping combat equipment working, making quickly incorporated
improvements; but no long range research was authorized. But the
colonel’s “for a while” tuned out to be a very short time, for late in
the summer of 1940, Sir Henry Tizard of England had brought over a treasure
chest of new ideas to this country, including priceless information on
a new resonant cavity magnetron which immediately gave great military potential
to the field of microwaves.
But to go on with my story on how the Men at Monmouth
and Men at MIT grew to become better acquainted, and collectively got together
on the same war.
It starts with Dr. Clark S. Robinson, a young and
recently commissioned Signal Corps lieutenant whom I “discovered” one day
doing research in a remote corner laboratory of MIT’s Radiation Laboratory.
His orders were quite proper, but on reporting my discovery to the Monmouth
command the reaction was that Lt. Robinson should be immediately ordered
to Monmouth where the problems were urgent.
As a start, I asked him to come down and spend
a day with me so that we might get better acquainted and I could then make
some recommendation as to how he would best fit into the Monmouth complex.
This he did, but when he arrived he was not allowed to enter my lab; reasons
- “his clearence was not in order.”
The Radiation Laboratory was just learning about
badges and clearance papers, and telephone arrangements were not accepted
locally. Our Colonel thought it was a good time to teach the boys
at MIT about procedures on such matters, and he tried. Robinson had
to spend three days awaiting his clearance - which never came through in
the correct form. While the technical objectives of his visit were
accomplished outside of the secure area, the next move came from MIT.
Learning well and rapidly, MIT set up their own
security system, and so tight that the strict Monmouth policy of that day
seemed more like open-house stuff. So coolness at the top command
continued. I suspect that two senior colonels, whose names I shall
not mention, never visited the Radiation Laboratory - perhaps they feared
that something might have been found “wrong” with their clearances; or
could the word be “reprisal?”
But where the behavior of military electrons was
concerned things were much more friendly. There was that cold night
when my friend and co-worker, John Marchetti, at long last decided to call
it a day.
The time was about midnight. As we walked
toward our cars we saw four shadows moving near a piece of new gear which
had just come into Sandy Hook that afternoon. Prompted by curiosity,
we went over, said “Hello,” and introduced ourselves (my memory today suggests
the names of Drs. Ridenour, Getting, Davenport and Col. Warner).
They were radar engineers from MIT and had brought
down a new piece of microwave equipment, the first model of what later
became the world-famous SCR-584. This particular trip had the objective
to learn how this microwave device might work with our SCR-268, then in
widespread operational use.
While their orders for admittance to the highly
classified area were quite correct, there was coolness, and they had been
completely ignored and let in on their own in a strange environment.
As an ad hoc committee of two, Marchetti and I took it upon ourselves to
roll out the welcome mat, helped them, told them where things were, and
so on.
About 2:00 A.M. we finally called it a second day
and we all went to my apartment where a bottle of rum and six lemons provided
a tonic that thawed things out in more ways than one.
On the following evening, Marchetti and I were
their guests for the biggest and best steak dinner we had seen for many
months, and we knew that meat was being rationed and that expense accounts
had not yet been invented. But from them on Rad Lab and Monmouth
personnel were on the same team!
6) MARCHETTI - THE HUMAN DYNAMO.
Having mentioned Marchetti earlier, I must spin
a couple of yarns about this living dynamo whose 90-hour work weeks, and
the men and women who worked with him, made history during the dark days
following Pearl Harbor.
Let me start my first story by quoting from the
spring 1962 issue of the EIMAC NEWS, a story by Charles Downs, “How to
Build a Secret Tube.” Where shall we start this story? On a
June morning eighteen years ago in Normandy, or before that, at the Panama
Canal, or years later on the slope of a numbered hill in Korea?
It is a strange story of a unique tube and an Army
major and Eimac. A second story by William I. Orr, which appeared
in the March 1964 issue of POPULAR ELECTRONICS, starts “The
Secret Tube That Changed the War.” Today it’s “junk,” a bargain
priced surplus special, but it is also history, the WW II tube no one knew
about.
I was the Army major, and the tube was the so-called
“Zahl Tube.” Although the tube was
my invention, it was Marchetti’s genius that made it work in a radar set.
Our lab, at the time, was at Fort Hancock on Sandy Hook, N.J. As
part of the coastal defenses of New York City, Fort Hancock had many 12-inch
guns, backed up with thousands of rounds of ammunition. In addition
to the big guns, we worked in an environment of field artillery pieces
pointing up and down the roads, plus many machine-gun emplacements protected
by concrete pill boxes.
All this armament was only secondary in guarding
our work. Ever present was the fear that well trained German commando-type
troops, if surprise-landed by a few sub-marines, could easily take over
and make Sandy Hook into an island by a few well placed explosives at the
Hook’s narrowest point of only 100 feet. Such an operation could
have easily given the Germans an opportunity to turn the 12-inch guns on
New York City with the devastating effects of a thousand big bombs.
A few hours would have been all they needed, for
by the time the U.S. could have organized an invasion party to recapture
Sandy Hook, the dmage would have been done. The Germans could have
surrendered as New York burned!
But back to Marchetti. In this bristling
environment our problem was to extend the early warning radar system, then
guarding the Panama Canal; German and Japanese battleships and aircraft
carriers were ranging in both oceans. We knew that our existing radar
was almost useless against low-flying aircraft; a fact, we suspected, of
which the enemy was also well aware. We needed radars operating at
higher frequencies which could detect low-flying aircraft. And to
make them even more effective, the plan was to mount these radars on picket
ships riding 100 miles off of each canal entrance.
With our boss, Colonel Colton, driving hard, success
came our way. Our little set was ready for an oceangoing test; we
could get ranges of 100 miles on bombers, and good coverage at very low
altitudes. Our first picket ship arrived, the M.S. Nordic, a trim
125-foot vessel, complete with crew. This test will never be forgotten.
Click
on Photo for more info.
7) Twenty Men and a Girl. Pg. 76
Before I am accused of writing Marchetti’s
biography, let me say this will be my last yarn dealing with him specifically.
In the Pacific Theater and in the CBI Theater,
both Generals MacArthur and Stilwell had appealed stateside for any help
possible in the location of enemy mortars, the deadly device that was causing
the majority of our ground causalities. The problem was one of finding
metal objects the size of a small tomato can, loaded with explosives, and
fired at our troops in bursts of hundreds, with nothing more complicated
than an augmented shotgun shell at the bottom of a piece of iron pipe.
Finding these clouds of hell-created torpedo raindrops
coming unannounced toward one from miles away was the first part of the
problem; the next was to establish definitive trajectories, trace the various
shell paths back to their points of origin and, by coincidence methods,
to saturate these enemy coordinates with overwhelming counterfire so that
peace and quiet would again prevail in those particular areas and many
thousands like them.
General Stilwell himself offered to personally
return to the United States if his presence would help in the expediting
of a solution to this most critical problem.
Marchetti had an idea: By a slight modification
of his earlier developed radar he could detect the mortar shell just after
it was fired, and then by tracing back the line of fire he could find where
it was fired from. Some quick test were made, and the idea worked
and would be invaluable in combat. Marchetti was challenged on how
rapidly a number of these radar could be modified and air-shipped to the
Pacific Theater. General MacArthur beckoned.
So in Building No. 20 of the Evans Laboratory,
twenty men and one girl swore to stay continuously on the job until a number
of operational sets were delivered to Newark Airport where transportation
would be anxiously waiting.
It was a strange scene as days and nights passed;
a few catnaps, sandwiches and much coffee, and the smell of solder filled
the air. A woman, Helena Schroeder, was the administrative assistant
responsible for everything but engineering. When she talked on the
phone, seeking supplies, food, and the like she used the language of the
Missouri mule drivers of World War I, but she got attention, and results.
And, as I put it later, “The Stars and Stripes blew violently in the breeze
when she spoke!”
After ninety-six consecutive hours trucks came
up, and the first equipment were loaded for flight into Pacific combat
areas. The tired, sleepy and bearded (with one exception) crew of
scientists and engineers cheered, and on the verge of collapse went home
to that well-earned long sleep which soon engulfed them.
8) What really WON the War? Pg. 83.
When one gets down to fundamentals, the winning
of World War II is the story of the electron tube.
The bomb would not have been possible without the skills of those extending
the technology of how to control and manipulate electrons in a vacuum environment.
Radar, from the very beginning, was a story of
unusual inventions such as magnetrons, klystrons, transmit-receive tubes,
rectifiers, switching devices, and the list could go on and on. The
proximity fuse represented the final product of putting together a miniature
radio in the nose of a shell, with the success of this device hinging primarily
on the development of an electron tube that could withstand the terrific
shock of being fired from a gun ( the transistor had not as yet been invented).
The entire area of tactical and strategic communications
hinged on the availability of tubes with sufficient power and frequency
versatility to make military radio communication systems very flexible.
For example, with the new highly directional relays rushed into operational
use by dedicated people, General Patton could not have pushed his tanks
forward at the speed he did because he would have quickly lost communications
with supporting elements to his rear.
The field of electronic countermeasures ( now called
electronic warfare ) was a race between the Allies and the Germans to see
who could first develop the tubes which would lead to the denial of the
use of other newly developed electronic devices being rushed into combat
service by both sides. The Germans were, perhaps, the first to demonstrate
the potential effectiveness of this new method of warfare when, after devastating
effectiveness at sea, the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
later joined by the Prinz Eugen, holed up in Brest. Juicy targets,
British bombers had trouble hitting them let alone finding them through
smoke screens and artistic camouflage.
The world was surprised and shocked, however, when
these three ships sailed from Brest on February 11, 1942, and made their
way through the British Channel under cover of fog and snow right under
the nose of the British Lion. What was not published at the time,
for security reasons, was that the ships passed by unmolested because the
Germans were jamming every British radar capable of giving warning.
As the years went by, and particularly during the Normandy invasion, the
Allies returned the compliment and electronic jamming and deception became
as much of the commander’s stock in trade as were rifles and bullets.
9) A tube crisis in the Pacific. Pg. 85.
Most tubes are very simple: a filament to produce
electrons, a grid to control the electrons, and a plate to catch them.
This is the well-known triode - being kicked around a bit these days by
the transistor. But the transistor wasn’t around during World War
II. Radar was very rough on many types of tubes required for successful
operations. Early wartime grids, unfortunately, developed the habit
of gradually becoming contaminated and giving off electrons themselves,
with the disastrous effect of making the set inoperative.
For a certain class of tubes we tried using platinum
wire in making up the grids, and it worked fine in the manufacturing plants
and on tests made within the U.S. However, platinum is a very soft
metal and could not stand much abuse in shipping.
In getting tubes to the Pacific they were subjected
to very harsh treatment, and so a large fraction of these critically needed
tubes arrived with short circuits between the grid and the filament.
So serious was the problem, that General MacArthur loaded two C-54 airplanes
with defective tubes and flew them back to California so that we could
better see the seriousness of his problem and, hopefully, do somethng about
it.
The job was given to me to visit the various manufactures
and see what could be done. I was provided with legal authority so
that over my own signature, on the West Coast, I could make irrefutable
decisions on the spot, involving some $40 million worth of contracts.
With me traveled a contract lawyer, and Max Markell, one of my top engineers.
Working with EIMAC, our major producer, we decided
that the only quick solution to the problem was to package the tubes as
though we were shipping nitroglycerine. We used springs, padding,
anything that would absorb shock. This we did, and I’ll never forget
the ball game we had one afternoon testing the final package. We
threw the package around, dropped them, kicked them, gave them any type
of torture… and they stood the test.
But EIMAC didn’t rest with the temporary solution.
The packages were costing more than the tubes, and that wasn’t good business.
Wanting toget rid of the expensive trouble-making platinum, they came up
with a new material they called their “X” grid. It was strong; it
did not contaminate in any way; but it had other properties too.
Tubes with the “X” grid lasted ten to twenty times as long as those using
previous techniques. But this fact, understandably, was slow in reaching
the depots where usage figures originated on which to base future procurements.
Once the “X” grid-type of tube was in service,
requisitions for more tubes dropped to a trickle, and with new tubes reaching
the depots every day the stock in-house piled higher and higher.
Finally, reaching the attention of the purchasing people, it was learned
that one tube type alone, the VT-127, was in surplus by over 500,000 -
enough to fight a 100-year-war, at the rate the tubes were being requisitioned.
The action which had to be taken was drastic.
An entire manufacturing facility at EIMAC, in Salt Lake City, was closed
down with twenty-four hour notice. While Army bookkeeping had skidded
to a new low, and EIMAC’s research to a new high, the thousand or so people
who lost their jobs in Salt Lake City where not so happy. When you
“win” you “lose,” it seemed to them.
10) THE JAPANESE PAY A COMPLIMENT. Pg. 87
The Fort Monmouth Electron Tube Museum contains a rather
interesting memento-a Japanese TR tube. This is a tube required by radars
for short-circuiting the very sensitive receiver while the powerful transmitting
pulse is being sent out.
During the early days of radar I built the first few
hundreds of these tubes with my own hands, following my design. These first
"homemade" tubes were used both in Panama and Hawaii until followed up
by production orders, about 100,000 finally being made.
In overrunning several of our Pacific sites, the Japanese
acquired such radars as we had there. And because we were well ahead of
them in radar, they immediately copied our designs. I personally consider
the museum Japanese TR tube as a supreme compliment, for in making the
copy not one single change was made in my design; they even copied some
of my early mistakes. But the tube worked both for us and for them.
The noted American inventor of FM radio,
the late Major H. Armstrong, had been working on a very high-powered radar
which was set up in the Evans area of Fort Monmouth. Lt. Colonel Jack DeWitt
and some of his associates played nights and weekends with this radar,
making some modifications which extended its range potential from hundreds
of miles to hundreds of thousands of miles-they hoped.
Playfully the colonel asked the Air Force for a target
to test the radar at a few hundred thousand miles, and they grinned back
at him. Even the German V-2 was just a small earthbound rocket. But Jack
knew what he wanted. He planned to "shoot for the
moon!"
Thus it came about that on January 10, 1946, a giant
antenna was bore-sighted on the Queen of the Skies-Diana. An engineer pushed
a button, and a powerful sure of energy moved out into space at 186,000
miles a second and aimed at caressing the moon with friendly radiation.
Then ,came the longest two and one-half seconds in history while a few
people waited to see whether any return radiation would be detectable.
IT WAS!
On a cathode-ray tube, exactly two and one-half seconds
later, up shot a "pip" indicating that some of the initial energy had made
the round trip from the earth to
the moon and back. Simultaneously a loudspeaker,
also coupled in, went "Oomph."
The space age had just been opened, though not
yet "officially."
Because of the importance of the event, and by the rules
of the day, the results of the experiment had to be kept
hi hl classified until officially cleared by the Pentagon
for public release.
Major General George Van Deusen, down in Washington,
blinked his eyes several times when he saw the Monmouth request to publicly
claim such a sensational advance in electronics. He understandably mused,
"Suppose the boys at Monmouth are wrong. A spurious signal generated locally
might have been mistaken for a moon echo, and that would be terrible publicity
for the conservative and sedate Army Signal Corps."
So he made a decision to move slowly, and in so doing
asked two eminent scientists, Dr. George Valley and Dr. Donald Fink, to
join him, on checking the validity of the Monmouth claims.
Several weeks later the experiment was repeated before
this august jury, and the results were conclusive. All were completely
convinced. (Some said that the loudspeaker "Oomph" sounded more like "Boomph"
that evening. )
Don Fink stepped up to the general and shook his hands
in congratulations. He said, "General, this is so important that it should
not have an ordinary news release. As you know, the Institute of Radio
Engineers is having an Annual Banquet very soon. With your permission,
I'll arrange for you to personally make the announcement at the banquet,
as the last and the most important thing on the program.
"I'll be happy to, Don," said the general, and we all
went home elated.
In the meantime, now with the go-ahead, our public relations
people drew up an official press release for 11:00 P.M. on the night of
the banquet, reasoning that surely by then the general would have finished
his presentation.
The banquet, held at a New York hotel, had the
usual two thousand members in attendance, routinely going through award
ceremonies, short speeches, to be climaxed by a longer prominent-person,
after-dinner talk of thirty minutes, then the general to top it off.
Overlooked, however, was the principal speaker, who did
not watch-the clock, apparently preferring a calendar. His allotted. thirty-
minutes stretched into one hour and twenty minutes, with at least half
of the audience gradually disappearing as he talked on and on. Because
the press release time of 11:00 p.m. had passed I went out on the street,
and sure enough, newsboys were. screaming "ARMY RADAR HITS MOON." Those
four words filled the entire front page of one paper. _
I hurriedly bought a paper and returned to the banquet
scene; the general, had just been introduced. He made his announcement,
and those remaining at their tables gave him a tremendous ovation, as they
also did to Col. DeWitt and his engineering associates. He bowed, and sat
down, applause still ringing throughout the hall.
I stepped over to the general and showed him my newspaper.
He grinned, got up, and raised his hand to silence the crowd and get their
attention. Holding up the newspaper so most of those present could see
the front page, he chuckled, "This; gentlemen, sets a new world record
in reporting Speed!" And it must have, because the paper had reported the
announcement before it was made.
Only a few months later, in an entirely
different situation, this same radar again attracted widespread public
attention, this time not with a cooperating moon, but with a noncooperating
comet.
On the night of October 9, 1946, the Giacobini-Zinner
comet was scheduled to pass close to the Earth, and from its tail the Earth's
atmosphere would be showered by countless small meteorites, making a gorgeous
visible display for those fortunate to have a clear sky overhead
The Jersey
sky that night, unfortunately, was overcast. But
to our Diana radar, clouds meant nothing. And it wasn't just the
small meteors (called the Draconids) in which we were interested; the big
game was the comet itself.
With world interest in what the radar could tell us,
the National Broadcasting Company, with their biggest network linkage,
requested permission to make a live broadcast on their "News of the World"
program with Morgan Beatty. NBC's Robert Denton was at the Diana
radar site, together with Princeton University's famed astronomer
John Q. Stewart, myself, and technicians.
Morgan Beatty in New York, spoke first: "You might think
that hunting for peace in Paris is like hunting for a needle in a haystack,
or a comet by radar. But the radar quest for a comet is actually
going on tonight. For that, we switch to the radar station at Belmar,
New Jersey."
After a few introductory remarks by Robert Denton
about Diana, I was given the microphone to describe our experiment. I pointed
out that not only was the Diana radar in operation, but elsewhere in the
U.S. we had 20 more radars simultaneously searching the skies - more in
New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, and Idaho.
Then, with tens of millions of people listening, we triggered
the famed and powerful moon radar and waited anxious seconds for a return
signal. There was none. Again and again we queried outer space and hoped
the comet would signal back. It didn't!
Wrapping up the program with some chagrin, I said, "This
doesn't seem to be a very good night, but we may have more information
when I get the reports from our other sites."
Unfortunately, by the time Professor Stewart and I released
the live microphone to a grasping Robert Denton, we had run twenty seconds
over our allotted time - a very serious thing of that day. It seems Tokyo
was talking to itself on the "News of the World," while we and a few million
should have been listening. Rumor had it that Robert Denton, unable adequately
to explain why he didn't retrieve the microphone sooner, was given considerably
more time than twenty seconds to make explanation.
But my story doesn't end here.
Report by report, we studied what our other radar stations
had to say about their observations of the Draconids. All was negative,
negative, negative . . . until White Sands, New Mexico, came in with a
sensational collection of radar echo pictures they had obtained on one
of our early warning radars, an SCR-270.
Amazingl
Surely, reasoned my colleagues John Q. Stewart, J. J.
Slattery (now with the Martin Company), and Dr. Michael Ference (now vice-president
of the Ford Motor Company), we had something terrifically important, suggesting
the discovery of a new layer of gas surrounding the Earth at a distance
greater than anything known in the ionosphere. The radar echoes from the
meteorites were clear, sharp, and showed apparent ranges well beyond the
so-called F-layer -- a sure Nobel prize, we thought.
So we four worked day and night for a month getting blurry-eyed
as we studied hundreds of photographs and building up a new theory for
the upper atmosphere. Yes, these small meteors seemed to have hit something
well above the Earth which, in a puff of entry fire, produced a cloud of
ions giving a strong return. We knew nothing then about the Van Allen belt,
but thought we had found something along the lines of the much more recent
Van Allen discovery. But, no!
The word finally arrived from White Sands that they had
misinterpreted my instructions. I had asked that they point their antennas
so they would look to the vertical, not to the horizontal, as would be
their normal way of pointing for early warning of aircraft. The message
said that instead of looking up, they were pointed toward the horizon.
And so, the distances measured by the radar had no altitude significance,
ranges being along the surface of the Earth and.. not from the surface
UP!
Our dreams of meeting with the King of Sweden
at a Nobel prize ceremony were dashed away. One thing of import, however,
the echoes from these little meteors were of themselves quite interesting
regardless of where from, how high, and so on. So it came about that the
Harvard College Observatory saw fit to give us the front cover page of
their magazine SKY and TELESCOPE -- a picture of a pea-sized meteor, viewed
by radar, as it entered the Earth's atmosphere and burned up. So
we were openly proud and inwardly chagrined.
Bikini offered the first opportunity
in providing a the mammoth test tube in which the materials of war could
be exposed to the crucible of an atomic blast under controlled conditions.
I was chosen to join Vice-Admiral Blandy's staff representing the Chief
Signal Officer, and be in charge of some tests we would make during the
two explosions,
We had a task force of about 40 men, and planned to make
every conceivable test on Signal Corps equipment placed under the duress
of atomic bomb environment. We even went to the extreme of taking the recently
"liberated" pride of the German fleet, the "pocket battleship" Prinz Eugen,
on which we installed the now famous SCR-584 radar.
Riding high, on the foredeck, they even used this
antiaircraft equipment as a guidance means to cruise from Philadelphia,
through the Panama Canal, to its lethal rendezvous with an atomic bomb
blast at Bikini. It wasn't going to be alone, however; for there it joined
a vast armada of Japanese, American, and other German ships destined to
a watery grave as we sought more information on the bomb's potential.
As a VIP, I left Washington shortly before midnight on
June 8, 1946. They had set up a special train that carried us directly
to the dock in Oakland, California, where we boarded our ship, the Blue
Ridge, destination Hawaii first, Eniwetok then Bikini and perhaps beyond,
for screaming editorials had been saying that we were probably on a one-way
trip because with the shock of an atomic underwater bomb, the atoll of
Bikini would collapse, with a tidal wave enveloping all 40,000 of the test
group including the many target vessels.
Regardless of this threat, several hundred of us joyously
moved across the continent on the biggest adventure of our lives. The special
train was loaded with congressional representatives, military, press, and
foreign guests. It was a gala trip.
Arriving at Hawaii we were enthusiastically received,
because our flotilla of three large 28,000-ton ships carried not only the
60 military representatives (of which I was one) on the Blue Ridge, but
also foreign visitors, including the USSR on a second ship, and finally
the all-important press on a third ship. Congressional representatives
sailed with the press. Making a big play for statehood, Governor Ingram
M. Steinback of the Territory of Hawaii literally turned the islands over
to us.
Never will be forgotten that night when the Royal Hawaiian
Hotel first opened its doors after being closed for the war. It was quite
a party, and in lush tropical surroundings we enjoyed the favorite local
beverage served in half coconuts. Native dancers carried on all around
us; everyone was in favor of atomic energy, the tests we were looking
forward to. The World was finally at peace, and we liked it! _ _
Suddenly, however, the scene changed. Sixteen street
urchins carrying newspapers burst in on us crying, "EXTRA! EXTRA! ATOMIC
BOMB TESTS CALLED OFF. WASHINGTON GETS SECRET REPORTS OF DANGER LURKING
AT BIKINI ATOLL."
There it was, a full front page of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
Quickly we bought copies, and sadly lamented that,
it seemed that we were about to turn around, our holiday
stopped, and go back to San Francisco. After about fifteen minutes of despair,
our half coconuts having been refilled, one character with very sharp eyes
piercing the dim light, saw fine print between the 4-inch headlines . .
. very small print indeed.
We gathered around the few lights we could find and read
the entire text. The large type we could see easily; the small print only
by straining: "ATOMIC BOMB TESTS . . . attracting world attention. Top
newsmen and scientists with many official observers are now in Honolulu
en route to the scene. Reports that the tests would be CALLED OFF . . .
as needless waste of taxpayer's money are without foundation. Preparations
are moving ahead smoothly for this historic experiment with gigantic physical
forces . . . . WASHINGTON GETS hour by hour reports from Bikini of the
plans to carry out this scientific test of a new factor in military power
and international relations. In addition to the news that will be flashed
all over the world there will be SECRET REPORTS made to the U.S. Army and
Navy on certain phases of the tests which will not be immediately revealed
even though unprecedented publicity attends this demonstration. Various
scientific analyses will be made OF DANGER LURKING in the skies, on the
surface or under the water as a result of the unloosing of the A-Bomb.
Meanwhile Hawaii welcomes this notable group of newsmen, scientists, and
official observers, and the Honolulu Star
Bulletin says `Aloha' as you go on to Operation
Crossroads AT BIKINI ATOLL"
The above happened on June 18, 1946, but never on any
April First, of any year, had such a good joke been played on anyone; and
the nuclear age stumbled forward as steel guitars played, and native dancers
moved softly in the moonlight . . . .
But we went to Bikini, leaving Hawaii behind, and we
shot off the two atomic bombs, one in the air and one under water. I cannot
think of a better way to close this tale than with a quote published in
SIGNAL, Sept.-October, 1946:
" . . At Mike hour an awesome spectacle occurred when
the waters of the lagoon arose like a giant asparagus tip. The central
column of water expanded until it covered more than 2,200 feet at the base,
with violent turbulence visible at the upper portion. The top of the column
of water spread out in mushroom fashion, and for a short time had the incredible
appearance of hanging suspended in air. Then the million or more tons of
water started falling like a great white curtain. As the descending cataract
struck the remaining water of the lagoon, a great frothiness appeared,
rising high above and engulfing the target vessels. ?l curtain of mist
arose from the lagoon to meet the white wall cascading downward. The entire
target array became enshrouded in the white, highly radioactive dangerous
fog. When the mist lifted, some of the ships were missing and others were
listing. Everyone who viewed this spectacle was forcefully aware that he
had just witnessed the grandest, but yet the most horrible thing ever conceived
by man ....
When I wrote the above, more than
twenty years ago, I was speaking of the devastating effect of a bomb in
the 20-kiloton class. Today we speak of 100 times greater violence and
the word is megatons! '''
With the cessation of hostilities in the
European Theater, substituting for bullets came political actions, economic
actions, and many things destined to have a long-range effect on this country's
research and development program. .On the latter point, there was the "Alsace
Mission," .a major program ;to investigate German technology, looking for
things which` might be useful if "liberated" and brought to this country.
One thing was obvious: the Germans were far ahead of us in certain areas.
From a civilian point of view, I can think of no better
example than the tape recorder. Here the German chemists had learned to
make a tape that had a much higher quality than available over here. American
industry was quick to capitalize on this point, and today almost everyone
owns a recorder.
From a military point of view, the V-2 stands out as
a shining example of leadership in a field in which we were relative amateurs.
Complete missiles, and many bits and pieces were brought over and stored
at White Sands, New Mexico, enough to make 50 operational missiles for
our people to experiment with and learn from; and our Ordnance Corps studied
as ex-rival Werner von Braun taught.
On most of these missiles, as they learned -how to fire
them, the Ordnance Corps allowed basic research projects to use the 1,000-pound
space which, when fired in anger, would hold the warhead. Thus there quickly
came into being an informal group of men whose interests were outer space
and who planned these experiments. It was my privilege to help start and
be a part of this group.
During the firing of these 50 V-2's, America's space
program was born. The "Panel on the Upper Atmosphere," as we called ourselves,
turned out to be the incubator for many of the men whose names are now
household words in connection with our space program. It was also largely
through the effort of these men, in their discussions with people at very
high level in government, that NASA came into being. .
On "Project Paperclip" it was not pieces of equipment
or missiles which were brought over from. Germany, it was people -- scientists,
engineers, and families. In the cruel years immediately following the war
there were many very able scientists and engineers who wished to leave
Western Europe and make a new. home in the United States.
"Screening" offices were accordingly set up in
Europe, and applications studied very carefully as to ability and previous
political interests. Simultaneously military laboratories in this country
were asked whether they wished any of these people, and their dossiers
were made available for decision purposes.
As most elsewhere, at Monmouth we had two
problems:
First, the war still remained very fresh in the memories
of our people; and second, we were still, releasing relatively
unskilled American citizens. But the superb talent, available
through "Paperclip" suggested once-in-a-lifetime opportunities,
and much of the top American talent was straining to get out of the military
environment back to their teaching jobs or to industry.
Demonstrative of the type of talent we were dealing with,
on each request the requester had to sign a statement to the effect that
the equivalent to the person he was asking for was not available in the
U.S. The problem of asking for this type of talent, or rather the
decision as to whether we should, was put squarely up to me as director
of research. I recommended "Yes, let's try it with 25 people," and
we were in business. This was probably one of the most important decisions
I have ever made.
The men and .their families then started coming over,
most of them with all their worldly possessions and hardly any money. The
title of "Doctor" soon grew common place at Monmouth. In coming over;
they were signed two-year contract, with our option to returning
them in six months
if we for any reason found them unsatisfactory After
the contract expired, Civil Service regulations allowed them to change
to what was called Schedule-A, a form of Civil Service which would
be finalized once citizenship had been achieved.
I have in my office a photo of the first 16 which came
over, hands up, swearing allegiance to the United States, as they move
into Schedule-A. Of these 16; now twenty years later, 11 still remain
at the Monmouth laboratory, all in very high positions, and one in the
very highest. It was a wonderful experience to see the old "Melting
Pot" in action.
In retrospect, throughout the country we see thousands
of our best citizens, able engineers, scientists, and administrators, with
a byproduct of tens of thousands of brilliant children in our schools .
. . the results of "Paperclip." Surely this
country is better and stronger because of that decision, made by a few
men more than two decades ago.
It was the, annual banquet of the Armed Forces- Communication
and Electronics Association, Washington,. D.C. The year was about 1949.
Radio comedian Arthur Godfrey was the after-dinner speaker. Knowing he
was. talking to an electronics-oriented audience, Godfrey decided to have
a little fun. It went something like this:
"Gentlemen, you know I was a radio ham years ago and
spent 'many .long nights jiggling that cat's whisker 'around on my
crystal looking for that most sensitive spot. Now I hear -tell that. after
years of research costing millions of dollars, you fellows have come up
with the idea of putting a second cat's whisker on the crystal-a transistor,
I think you call it. That, gentlemen, I call progress!"
It was my privilege to be present for the first showing
(Godfrey's "progress") among the people where it all happened. On June
23, 1948, Dr. E. O. Buckley, President of the Bell Telephone Laboratories,
had invited six persons - two from each Service - to witness a new invention.
I was one of the two selected from the Army.
The six of us were asked to raise our right hand and
solemnly swear not to reveal to anyone what we were about to see until
the Bell Laboratories had made an official unclassified press announcement
of their as yet commercially "top secret" and unrevealed invention.
The invention was the transistor, the device which everyone
now knows has completely revolutionized elec-tronics, and even changed
many people's way of life, includ-ing ways of warfare. The demonstration
was quite dramatic. A complete radio set, very miniaturized, taking almost
no power but yet playing just as well as a commercial version of that day
which used electron tubes.
The inventors, Drs. Shockley, Brattain, and Bardeen (all
later given Nobel prizes) had a rather critical question to put to me.
They knew that the Signal Corps was support-ing some solid state research
under Professor Lark-Horowitz at Purdue. Research so forward-looking that
the Purdue laboratory was publishing about thirty high class papers a year,
all unclassified.
However, with this record, the Bell scientists thought,
it was not entirely out of the question that Lark-Horowitz had also made
the invention with a good possibility (if so) that the Army might have
locked it up under a high mili-tary classification.
When questioned on this point, I could sense their relief
when I answered in the negative. But I did say, "I believe in the `Principle
of Simultaneity of Invention.' Purdue would have had it in six months."
And I think they would have.
I mention this little story about Lark-Horowitz because
after I published an article called "The Birth of the Tran-sistor," in
the July 1966 issue of the Microwave Journal, I received a letter from
Dr. Fred Llewellyn. He was with the Bell Laboratories at the time of the
transistor disclosure and, as a key scientist, was well aware of what was
going on, and also knew the exact date when Bell would-make the press
release.
In writing to me, Fred said that this date coincided
with, a trip he was making around the Swedish archipelago in a small boat
provided by the Swedish government as a courtesy to members of a conference
going on in Stockholm. As it happened, Professor Lark-Horowitz was also
on the boat, and Fred knew that on that day he could openly dis-cuss the
invention of the transistor. Fred wrote, "I believe that I was the first
one to inform him that the Bell Labora-tories had arrived at this important
milestone."
Professor Lark-Horowitz (now deceased) often ex-pressed
his regrets to me for overlooking the practicality of some of the research
results he saw unfolding in his lab-oratory. But he was a teacher and not
an inventor, drinking deeply, however, from the cup of pleasure which came
from knowing that his contributions were in helping the young and providing
the world with new knowledge, certainly some of which helped to hurry the
date of the transistor arrival.
With the news of the transistor now public, we in the
military Services moved quickly to capitalize on its poten-tial. Its first
apparent promise was to relieve the GI of one of his biggest headaches-carrying
weight; with a smaller radio he could carry more food and bullets. So the
new invention was considered red-hot, and we went all-out to expedite its
application.
But a cloud appeared on the horizon. Because of its importance,
there were some with the military Services who thought that we should ask
Bell to classify this new device as "secret," and thus deny the use of
it to unfriendly coun-tries. Proponents for classification gave the analogy
to the discovery of fission, suggesting that we should make another big
Manhattan Project and go "underground." Personally, I was much opposed,
and at every chance urged against such a course. In the end the cloud disappeared,
and the unclassified status remained. And, in the solid state, this country
remains ahead of the world because of competitive accomplishments symbolizing
the strength of our free-enter-prise system.
Not content, however, with causing one revolution in
electronics, the transistor today surges on to even greater glories, for
it is the heart of the new technology of the integrated circuit, postage-stamp
radios and the like. This further compression of electronic potential bids
fair to again reach into everyone's life and make changes, be it for making
machines which can think better than man, extend-ing automation orders
of magnitude beyond that now in existence, changing the tactics of war
or, to be more pleasant, making radical changes in the things Santa Claus
will leave little boys and girls at Christmas.
We at the Monmouth laboratories take a lot of pride in
our early contributions to the space age. To name a few: The moon radar,
January 1946; radar observations of the Draconids (meteorites), October
9, 1946; assistance provided during the days when communications were being
established over an area now known as the Atlantic Missile Range off Cape
Kennedy; installation of the solar cells which for years provided power
for the little IGY "grapefruit" satellite, launched on May 17, 1958; the
first voice message from outer space on December 19, 1958, when President
Eisenhower made his historic Christmas message from Satellite SCORE; the
first weather satellite, TIROS, launched on
April 1, 1960; the first active communications satellite, Project COURIER,..
launched on October 4, 1960; and assistance given to the U.S. Army
Satellite Communications Agency on Project SYNCOM,
But let me push the "big history" aside to peek behind
the scenes and tell the story of an historic event unknown to most people.
This is a vignette in which I definitely do not appear
as the hero. In fact, I could easily have been the villain. It is a story
from behind the scenes when the U.S. was smarting under the spectacular
success of the Russians in their bid for supremacy in space. It is also
a story of our first major attempt to show the people. of our country that
we also were starting in this space business.
The time frame was late in 1958, and the, Sputniks
were buzzing all around us. Our plan was for the Air Force to place an
Atlas missile into orbit (with a dummy warhead, of course), while riding
piggyback was to be a radio transponder capable of accepting messages from
the earth and relaying them back far beyond the usual line-of-sight.
It was dubbed Project SCORE.
If we could do these two things, we would have passed
the Soviet record in tonnage orbited and, even more important, we would
have, demonstrated the practicality of using satellites for communications.
Although this project was classified "secret,"
information still leaked out because many hundreds of people were involved.
Not daring to risk the publicity of possible failure, drastic steps were
ordered to improve security. Roy John-son, then director of the Advanced
Research Agency, DoD, even went to the, extreme of "ordering the project
cancelled." _ .
Behind the scenes, however, a major acceleration of effort
was also ordered, while security was upped to the equivalent of "top secret."
Only those who absolutely had to know, were declared "in." This small group
identified themselves as the "88 Club," because this number represented
the total number of personnel who really knew what was going on.
Everything possible was camouflaged; even tales were
invented to explain inconsistencies when probing questions were asked by
those who wondered "why all the rush on a project officially declared `dormant'."
Ceorge Senn, and his deputy Samuel Brown, both of Monmouth,
, had the responsibility for communications ground stations and for the
space transponder radio. The plan was to carry a routine voice recording
on a tape and on the first orbit, as the satellite Passed over Fort MacArthur
in California, give the "bird' a command to unload its tape and transmit
the message to the ground station. After that, the tape could be used again
and again to both receive and transmit. If successful, it would mean the
start of space-age global communications.
Launching was scheduled for December 18, 1958. Most people
on the Cape, including the launching crews, thought little about the package
riding high on the missile. But something unscheduled happened. On December
17, Brigadier Ceneral Earle Cook, Deputy Chief Signal Officer, flew in
from Washington with a very small "top secret" package in his pocket. At
Canaveral he told Mr. Brown that the message on the tape had to be changed
for the contents of the new tape he was carrying.
To Sammy Brown and his team of four this was no small
problem, for the big rocket was in its final hours before lift-off. What
to do? Climb up that load of liquid dynamite and change the message? Hardly!
Suppose someone accidentally triggered the ignition button? An astronaut
in orbit without a space suit - fame yes, but that would be all. And more
seriously, any attempt now to physically change the two rolls of tape would
not be possible without changing the launching schedule. And that was out.
But necessity is the mother of invention, and Sammy came
up with a possible solution. It was a gamble, and involved great risk in
compromising the security of the entire venture. So, while most people
on the Cape slept, at 3 A.M. on December 18, stealthily a radio beam at
158 megacycles was directed at the ghostly silhouette of the Atlas three
miles away and almost ready for its mission into the unknown.
Using the planned interrogation sequency, boldly, the
transponder was directed to erase the first message and accept the new
one then put on the radio beam. For a short minute, if anyone would have
intercepted that radio beam they would have heard the message: It was from
President Eisenhower, extending Christmas greetings to the whole world
Maximum publicity if successful, zero publicity if it didn't come out well!
Fortunately no one intercepted the radio transmission
while the tape was being reloaded. Sammy had apparently won on his gamble,
but he still didn't know whether the new message was on, or if he had just
washed out the tape. He didn't dare a test playback.
A few hours later, in a burst of flame, the Atlas zoomed
upward and was successfully maneuvered into the desired orbit. At Fort
MacArthur a radio receiver awaited the rocket as it came over the Pacific
Ocean. A transcontinental telephone line was kept open for instant relaying
of the message to a special number in the Pentagon equipped with a tape
recorder. At the correct instant, the California station sent out the command
for the satellite to start transmitting. Nothing happened. Something was
wrong. The big bird silentl went winging its way across the continent,
and then circle the earth a number of times out of range of U.S. ground
stations equipped with the special receiver and the command interrogator.
The next day, December 19, the satellite made a pass
close to Canaveral. Brown and his team tried an interrogation. To their
great delight the satellites voice came to life and the message came in
loud and clear and was recorded.
But this Signal Corps team was not cued in on what
to do with the "hot tape" because this part of the operation had been assigned
exclusively to the California station!
Almost 1,000 miles away, I was at the Fort Monmouth Astro-Electronics
Center when Sammy called me in desperation. "Doc, I've got this red-hot
tape and don't know where to send it. And people here are trying to take
it away from me, including an Air Force colonel. What shall I do?"
Even though director of research of our laboratories,
I was unable to advise him because details of the previously
established Communications net were known only
to MacArthur and the Pentagon terminal people. I asked Sammy
to hold the wire and, above all, to hold that tape. On another phone,
I quickly put in a priority call to the Pentagon. Playing a hunch, I asked
for my, friend Bob Brady who I knew just had to be a member of the 88-Club.
My guess was correct. He gave me the crucial number,
and asked to please hurry before someone else "gets lucky and makes an
intercept, or hits Sammy on the head with a club." After passing the number
to Canaveral, I put my associate Lloyd Manamon on the phone. Lloyd
gave Sammy some good "illegal" advice on how to match the output
of a tape recorder to a telephone line without going, through an audio
phase which would tend to deteriorate the quality of the signal. ..
:
Sammy then placed a "collect" call to the number
I had given him. In Washington the secretary answering the phone
almost refused to accept the call, not knowing that it was for Sammy Brown's
call. She was supposed to keep the line clear. But Bob Brady moved
in and the call was accepted and recorded. Minutes later, Roy Johnson of
ARPA was on his way to inform the President that his voice had come in
well from outer space, a major accomplishment for 1958 technology. Plans,
and they were kept as older people will remember, were for the President
to personally inform the world of this success, for it meant much toward
bolstering U. S. prestige against the dramatics of the Soviet Union.
However, my troubles were not over yet. Sammy Brown,
in Florida, was still harassed by people who wanted the tape or copies
of it, now that the Pentagon was taken care of. Again his question to me
was "what to do?" I contacted the Signal Corps Public Information Office
in Washington.
The colonel in charge was out, but his secretary blithely
told me her boss had said it was OK to lift the restrictions. This I told
Brown, and the tape rush was on at Cape Canaveral.
Moments later a horrendous thought came to me and 1 started
sweating feverishly. Suppose the girl didn't know what I was really asking,
and had said OK to something else on her mind? Security had prevented me
from stating the entire situation on the telephone and she could easily
have been thinking of something else. But now it was too late, and I had
visions of what might happen to me if someone beat the President to a planned
national release, perhaps even a premature retirement or a cold winter
in Leavenworth.
I was in torture for thirty minutes as I listened to
the radio, waiting for something to break. About 5:00 P.m. it came. "We
interrupt this program . . . the President of the United States has a very
important message for the people of the world . . ."
I felt twenty years younger all at once!
History records Project SCORE as the world's first active
communications satellite. Although the device that repeated Ike's historic
Christmas message in 1958 eventually went to a fiery death on re-entry,
today the Smithsonian Institution proudly displays its twin for all the
world to see. But even as I write I have not checked with the Signal Corps
Public Relations Office in Washington on whether that secretary really
answered my question correctly. I shudder to think that she might have
been thinking of something else.
Page updated May 27, 2005
page created July 3, 1999