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The successful orbiting of the 184.3 pound Sputnik 1 launched man - in quite dramatic fashion - on a quest to ever greater distances from earth. Engineers and
scientists realized that with modifications and increased thrust, the rocket which launched Sputnik could reach to the moon and beyond. The race was on.

would be significant tasks for us in the Vanguard program and that we should start to plan for bigger things to come afterwards. Nevertheless. rumors have it that the Lunchbox report soon found its way to the Pentagon's incinerator for classified documents.
     As the Navy's Vanguard development got underway in late 1955, a Technical Panel on the Earth Satellite Program of the US National Committee for the IGY. consisting mostly of prominent scientists from universities. was charged with the selection of payloads for the four scheduled IGY satellites. Although some strong contenders had already been identified. the panel wished to give the entire US scientific community an opportunity to present its ideas in a special Symposium on Scientific Uses of Earth Satellites at the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, in late January 1956. Of the 34 papers, four were from Signal Corps scientists of SRDL. One of these proposals, a first simple concept to obtain images of the earth's cloud cover by Stroud and Nordberg, was then accepted by the panel and tentatively scheduled as payload for the fourth (and last) Vanguard satellite. SRDL was given NSF funding for this project.
     But in addition to this definite instrumentation package. SRDL and other Signal Corps organizations soon be involved in other tasks. The technical operation and maintenance of the primary satellite tracking and telemetry groundstations of the Vanguard Minitrack network, one in the US and five in South America, were assigned by DoD to the Signal Corps and were carried out by the Army Communications Systems Division. Related to this phase of work, SRDL assisted later in calibrating the Minitrack system by producing signals from outer space generated by bouncing radiowaves off the moon using its advance Diana radar facility at Belmar. N.J.

     While we at SRDL were busy on our limited IGY assignments, particularly on plans for future satellites which would be developed through military projects, the Army Ordnance Corps' rocket and missile activities were refocused in the establishment in 1956 of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Huntsville, Alabama. Maj. Gen. J. B. Medaris was commander and the yon Braun team was one of its essential elements. Although the rejection of the Orbiter had been a disappointment for the rocket experts, they soon found useful new ways to advance related rocket and missile technology. Their vital new mission was to develop and operationally test missile nose cones which could sustain the mechanical and thermal stresses of re-entry from space into the atmosphere. In pursuit of this task, the Redstone missile concept was advanced to the more powerful and sophisticated Jupiter C configurations, which in a historical test-flight on 20 September 1956 reached an unprecedented altitude of 682 miles and landed 3400 miles downrange from the launching site at Cape Canaveral.
     This test demonstrated, beyond doubt, that the Jupiter C had the full capability of placing a good size satellite payload into orbit. Considering the fact that the Vanguard project seemed to be already in serious trouble, Gen. Medaris pleaded with the Washington authorities for permission to provide our nation with the first satellite, but his request was not granted. In a wise move, he salted two sets of Jupiter C hardware away in safe storage in case Washington should ever change its mind and quick action should be required.
SPUTNIK I
     As a tragic consequence of Washington's refusal, the Russians beat us to the punch and surprised the entire world with Sputnik I, which they sent into orbit by means of a powerful military rocket on 4 October 1957.
     I shall never forget the impact of this event on all of us at SRDL who had been trying day and night to secure for our nation first place in space. During the preceding days. I had attended one of those international IGY committee conferences in which the Russians were prominently represented. From the very beginning, we had a serious problem with the translation of their presentations and pronouncements, which eventually was provided by interpreters from the USSR Washington Embassy. The Russians mentioned that their satellites would be called Sputniks, which stands for traveling companion, and we were most anxious to get information on their launching dates. There was considerable confusion on the valid translations of their answers which ranged from "in the next days" to "in the near future." But when at a closed executive session of the US delegation on 3 October. it was disclosed that the Russians had informally requested further US support with Backer-Nunn optical tracking cameras, it was concluded that their tracking network was not yet finished and that no immediate satellite launches should be expected. In view of our slipping Vanguard schedules, this was a happy conclusion which prompted me to plan to spend a rare weekend without professional chores.
     But I had hardly returned from Washington when the telephone rang.
     1 must admit that we were poorly prepared for such an event and other organizations, particularly the IGY
                     THE ARMY COMMUNICATOR    FALL 1981    21
Page updated January 4, 2004   page created November 04, 2000


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