gradually introduced
information on the evolving potential for launching satellites and their
unique capabilities as tools for geophysical research. As a result, in
a crucial meeting in Rome, Italy on 4 October 1954, a resolution to recommend
the use of satellites during the IGY was adopted by the international body.
The USSR, which only recently had announced IGY participation, had no comment
and remained for the time being mum on the subject.
Thus, contrary to common belief that an IGY was routinely coming along
for 1957/58 and coincidentally presented a splendid opportunity to introduce
satellites in a peaceful international demonstration of scientific applications,
it was just the other way around. The US successfully bent the ear of the
international groups and cleverly staged an IGY 25 years ahead of schedule,
specifically toward this goal.
Within this framework, major funding for IGY satellite projects had to
come from NSF although it was fully recognized that their execution and
operation would be impossible without the direct participation and support
of the military services. A US committee of the IGY worked out preliminary
plans and endorsed them through NSF to NAS and further on to President
Eisenhower, who considered them favorably.
By early summer 1955, the time had come to select a project plan which
would offer an all-around satisfactory solution. In 1954 there were still
indications that the three services - or at least the Army and the Navy
- might team up to a joint satellite project proposal, but subsequently
all services decided to compete separately.
The Air Force was not very forceful and specific in its bid and wanted
to be selected only if Army or Nauy plans were not satisfactory. The use
of an Atlas rocket was proposed: it was under development and it could
offer payloads of at least 150 pounds and later probably more than 1000
pounds.
The Army, based on its previously conceived Orbiter plan, suggested the
expansion of the well-proven capabilities of the Redstone missile concept,
initially offering payloads of at least five pounds. but most likely more.
The Navy proposed to start a completely new rocket development which would
be derived from its successful Viking sounding rocket. with payload expectations
in the 40 pound range.
The time span required for proposed developments was a crucial factor since
launchings had to be accomplished within the IGY, 1957 58. In this respect
the Army. with existing hardware, offered the lowest risk; the Air Force
approach, based on ongoing missile developments. was not quite safe; and
the Navy's completely new start entailed the highest schedule risk.
VANGUARD
In July 1955, a special committee, consisting of recognized experts from
academia and industry, was established at the level of the assistant secretary
of defense to select the most desirable plan considering all technological.
economical, political and psychological factors.
While this committee was pondering over the proposals, pressure mounted
on President Eisenhower to announce publicly the US intention to launch
satellites during the IGY since a similar announcement from the USSR seemed
imminent. The President obliged and on 29 |
July 1955 the nation
and the world were stunned by the revelation that space endeavors had become
a reality. This was none too soon since the USSR followed with a similar
announcement within a few days.
Now the pressure was on the DoD committee, which finally reached its verdict
on 9 September 1955. The choice was the Navy proposal and the project was
given the name Vanguard. The decision was by no means unanimous and it
was later speculated that the Army plan would have been adopted had not
one important committee member been absent due to sickness during the final
voting. Aside from technical considerations, the committee felt that the
utilization of a launching vehicle, which would be an offspring of a scientific
sounding rocket rather than of a military missile, was a most appropriate
way to introduce satellite concepts for peaceful scientific purposes during
an international enterprise. The Russians had no scruples along these lines
and immediately pressed their most powerful military rocket developments
into their satellite program and consequently beat us to the punch. Moreover,
the reasoning of the committee was not quite logical since both the Viking
and the Redstone had utilized the basic design of the V-2 military rocket.
In retrospect. the committee's decision, although, no doubt, the result
of an honest pursuit to offer the US the best solution, was a tragic mistake.
Both the rejected Army and Air Force concepts resulted in successful satellite
launchings long before the Vanguard program finally managed to place one
of the planned IGY payloads, at least physically, into orbit.
SRDL
INVOLVEMENT
The official involvement of the Signal Research and Development Laboratory
at Fort Monmouth, N.J. started in June 1955. In a secret letter, dated
15 June, the Chief Signal Officer. Lt. Gen. J. O'Connell. directed that
all activities of the Labs commence a crash effort to produce proposals
in support of the IGY satellite program, covering all pertinent aspects
of scientific instrumentation, telemetry, tracking, associated electronic
componentry and ground support. Proposals for future satellite utilization
beyond the limited scope of the IGY program were also requested.
An enthusiastic group of selected outstanding scientists
and engineers. working
long hours, produced the response.
Based on the past
ten years of close involvement with similar
aspects of the sounding
rocket program at the White Sands
activities, it seemed
easy to expand the concepts now to
satellites. As a result,
under the codename Lunchbox, a
secret set of proposals
(three Volumes. 327 pages) was
submitted to the chief
signal officer on 9 September.
Responding to all
aspects of his directive, they included
already strong arguments
for long range utilization of
satellites as communications
relays, both in the passive
reflector and active
repeater modes, for weather forecasting
and for electronic
intelligence gathering. _
Ironically, the completion date of 9 September 1955 of our Lunchbox report
coincided with the date of the DoD committee's verdict to reject the Army's
Orbiter proposal. We knew, of course, of the Orbiter and had hoped that
the Ordnance Corps' yon Braun team would be the winner and our already
existing close relationship would lead us to a key role in satellite electronics.
Needless to say, we were dismayed. But from Washington came word that there
still |
Previous
Page
Next
Page
Back to the Ziegler Index
Back to the InfoAge Homepage